Mercer University School of Law

Mercer Law School Digital Commons
Faculty Publications

Faculty

2014

Bringing a World of Light to Technology and Judicial Ethics
David Hricik
Mercer University School of Law, hricik_d@law.mercer.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/fac_pubs
Part of the Judges Commons

Recommended Citation
David Hricik, Bringing a World of Light to Technology and Judicial Ethics, 27 Regent L. Rev. 1 (2014).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty at Mercer Law School Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Mercer Law School
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

BRINGING A WORLD OF LIGHT TO TECHNOLOGY AND
JUDICIAL ETHICS
David Hricik*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION: WHY EVEN LUDDITE JUDGES NEED TO KNOW ABOUT
TECHNOLOGY ................................................................................................. 2
I. ETHICAL ISSUES ARISING FROM FACEBOOK AND SOCIAL NETWORKING
SITES .............................................................................................................. 5
A. Why a Judge May Not Be Able to Have Friends . . . on Facebook, at
Least .......................................................................................................... 5
B. Policies to Consider Beyond Friending ............................................... 9
II. ETHICAL ISSUES ARISING FROM PERSON-TO-PERSON COMMUNICATIONS 9
A. Confidentiality of E-mail ..................................................................... 9
B. The Permanency of Text Messages .................................................... 10
C. The Hidden Dangers of Metadata ..................................................... 11
D. Third-Party Storage of Court Data: Storms in the Cloud? .............. 13
III. DATA HELD OR ACCESSIBLE BY DEPARTING COURT PERSONNEL ......... 14
IV. LAWYERS’ USE OF THE INTERNET TO RESEARCH JURORS ...................... 14
V. JURORS’ USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE INTERNET .............................. 16
A. Jurors’ Use of the Internet to Research Facts and Law ................... 16
B. Jurors’ Use of the Internet to Discuss Pending Cases ...................... 17
C. Courts Fight Back: Model Instructions and Beyond ........................ 18

*
Professor of Law, Mercer University School of Law, Macon, Georgia. This article
was made possible, in part, by a research grant from the law school. I would like to thank
my research assistant, Lee Ann Hughes, for her assistance with the article. The title is from
the song, “World of Light” from the CD “Swings and Roundabouts” by John Wesley Harding.

2

REGENT UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:1

VI. JUDICIAL USE OF THE INTERNET TO CONDUCT FACTUAL RESEARCH .... 18
VII. MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES ...................................................................... 20
A. Blogging .............................................................................................. 20
B. Do Not Do What These Judges Did ................................................... 21
CONCLUSION AND SOME PRACTICAL TIPS ON WHAT TO DO ........................ 21
APPENDIX A .............................................................................................. 23
INTRODUCTION: WHY EVEN LUDDITE JUDGES NEED TO KNOW ABOUT
TECHNOLOGY
The Luddites thought that by smashing machines in early 19th
Century England, they could eliminate the threat that those machines
presented to them.1

2

Of course, they were wrong. As was the case during the Luddites’ time,
technology continues to march inexorably onward in today’s society.3 As a
result, those within the legal community—judges in particular—have no
choice but to begin using technology. Although judges are currently using

1
Nelson P. Miller & Derek S. White, Helping Law Firm Luddites Cross the Digital
Divide—Arguments for Mastering Law Practice Technology, 12 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV.
113, 113 (2009) (describing a group of British workers in the early 1800s who destroyed
machinery in the hopes of saving jobs, as well as those who generally oppose changes in
technology).
2
Frame-breakers, or Luddites, smashing a loom, HISTORICALBRITAIN.ORG,
http://historicalbritain.org/2013/07/18/the-luddites/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2014).
3
See CHRISTOPHER J. DAVEY ET AL., NEW MEDIA AND THE COURTS: THE CURRENT
STATUS AND A LOOK AT THE FUTURE 11 (2010), available at http://ccpio.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/02/2010-ccpio-report-summary.pdf (noting how social media has the
potential to upset the balance between openness and fairness in the judicial system).
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technology, they sometimes do so without understanding what they are
doing.4
Already, today’s “new-fangled” contraptions have ensnared judges.
Perhaps the most widely known example is Judge Kozinski of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.5 While he was sitting by
designation in district court and presiding over an obscenity trial, it came
to light that he had stored photos on the Internet including a pornographic
image and a video depicting a man in the act of bestiality.6 Judge Kozinski
said he thought the information was not publicly available.7 Although
pornographic photos make Judge Kozinski’s failure to appreciate
technology perhaps the most memorable, he is certainly not alone in
failing to appreciate technology.8 As this Article shows, judges have
created embarrassing posts, made awkward statements, set permanent
examples of poor judgment, and done worse.9
Even if a judge chooses to avoid using “new-fangled” contraptions like
e-mail, social media, cloud storage, and other modern inventions, those
around him or her are likely using all sorts of new technology. Court staff,
law clerks, interns, jurors, and attorneys are using various new tools for
surprising and sometimes unintuitive purposes. For example, jurors have
been caught posting information about trials on Twitter and Facebook,
and they have sometimes formed groups to talk among themselves prior
to submission of the case.10 Of course, jurors are also using various online
resources to conduct factual investigation.11 Additionally, “friendships”
between a judge and attorney have caused mistrials, and lawyers are
4
See Trevor Timm, Technology Will Soon Be Reshaped by People Who Don’t Use
Email, THE GUARDIAN (May 3, 2014, 7:30 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
2014/may/03/technology-law-us-supreme-court-internet-nsa.
5
Dan Slater, Judge Kozinski on Sexually Explicit Material He Posted: “It’s Part of
Life.,” WALL ST. J. (June 11, 2008, 2:34 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2008/06/11/reportjudge-alex-kozinski-maintained-porn-on-personal-web-site/.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
See infra Part VII.B.
9
See, e.g., Slater, supra note 5; Matt Volz, Federal Judge Sent Hundreds of Bigoted
Emails, YAHOO NEWS (Jan. 17, 2014, 8:18 PM), http://news.yahoo.com/federal-judge-senthundreds-bigoted-emails-001239518--election.html (discussing a federal judge who sent
hundreds of racist e-mails from his federal e-mail account); infra Part VII.B.
10 Jacqueline Connor, Jurors and the Internet: Jury Trials and Millenials [sic],
CAALA ADVOCATE MAGAZINE, (Sept. 2011), available at http://www.adrservices.org/
pdf/Jurors%20and%20the%20Internet.pdf; see also Dimas-Martinez v. State, 385 S.W.3d
238, 248–49 (Ark. 2011) (recognizing the impact social media by juror can have on a case).
11 NPR Staff, For Modern Jurors, Being on a Case Means Being Offline, NPR (June
24, 2013, 4:09pm), http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2013/06/24/195172476/
JURORS-AND-SOCIAL-MEDIA (reporting that jurors regularly look up legal terms on the
Internet and share about trial details on social media).
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using social media while picking juries in the courtroom to research jurors
in ways that could concern the judiciary.12
Of course, judges are also subject to ethical restrictions.13 These
restrictions may vary depending upon whether the judge is a state or
federal judge and, if he is a state judge, what state rules apply to him.
Generally, however, a Luddite judge who is unaware of what other
participants in the judicial system are doing may be acting at his or her
own peril. This unawareness is at least problematic because of common
provisions of judicial ethical codes such as the following rules from the
ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct upon which many state codes are
based:
 “A judge shall act at all times in a manner that
promotes public confidence in the independence,
integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall
avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety”;14
 “A judge shall not abuse the prestige of judicial office
to advance the personal or economic interest of the
judge or others, or allow others to do so”;15
 “A judge shall not convey or permit others to convey
the impression that any person or organization is in
a position to influence the judge”;16 and
 “A judge shall not make any public statement that
might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome
or impair the fairness of a matter pending or
impending in any court, or make any nonpublic
statement that might substantially interfere with a
fair trial or hearing.”17
This Article discusses various issues that judges must be aware of in
the Digital Age—even if they personally choose not to use “new-fangled”
technology. Judges must keep abreast of conduct that implicates
applicable ethical rules.
12 Ed Silverstein, Social Media Can Cause Problems for Lawyers When it Comes to
(Apr.
29,
2014),
Ethics,
Professional
Responsibility,
INSIDECOUNSEL.COM
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2014/04/29/social-media-can-cause-problems-for-lawyerswhen-i; Jenna Gant, Lawyers’ Use of Social Media for Jury Selection OK’d by ABA,
COURTNEWSOHIO.GOV (Oct. 1, 2014) http://www.courtnewsohio.gov/happening/2014/
ABASocialMedia_100114.asp#.VDDB8PldWSp.
13 See, e.g., infra notes 14–17 and accompanying text.
14 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2007), (emphasis added) (footnotes
omitted).
15 Id. R. 1.3 (footnote omitted).
16 Id. R. 2.4(C).
17 Id. R. 2.10(A) (footnotes omitted).
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I. ETHICAL ISSUES ARISING FROM FACEBOOK AND SOCIAL NETWORKING
SITES
A. Why a Judge May Not Be Able to Have Friends . . . on Facebook, at Least
As of January 2014, 74% of people who use the Internet also use social
networking sites.18 Even among Internet users aged 50 to 64, 65% were
active on social media sites in 2013.19 Although statistics for the judiciary’s
use of social media are less reliable, a 2012 Conference of Court Public
Information Officers’ survey showed that 46.1% of the responding judges
used social media with 86.3% of those that were doing so using Facebook
and another 32.8% using LinkedIn.20 Those judges were also aware of the
potential ethical issues their activities implicated: 45.4% “disagreed or
strongly disagreed” with the statement that “ ‘[j]udges can use social
media . . . in their professional lives without compromising . . . ethics.’ ”21
These issues are getting bar counsels’ attention. In a recent Georgia
Bar Journal column, Paula Frederick—general counsel for the State Bar
of Georgia—stated that “[e]ven maintaining a social media presence that
is strictly personal with no hint of one’s status as judge is not foolproof.”22
To illustrate her point, she gave the hypothetical example of a judge who
had simply disclosed in a Facebook post that a dog had bitten him when
he was a child—information which turned out to have extraordinary value
to a plaintiff’s lawyer who dropped the jury demand and instead went with
a bench trial before that judge for a dog-bite case.23 Some of the formal
authorities have addressed if and to what extent a judge may participate
in social media like Facebook. For instance, the American Bar Association
(ABA) and several states allow judges to use social media,24 but they have
18 Pew
Research
Internet
Project,
Social
Networking
Fact
Sheet,
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheets/social-networking-fact-sheet/ (last visited Nov. 14,
2014).
19 Id.
20 DAVEY ET AL., supra note 3, at 5, 65.
21 John G. Browning, Why Can’t We Be Friends? Judges’ Use of Social Media, 68 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 487, 488 (2014).
22 Paula Frederick, To Friend or Not to Friend, 19 GA. BUS. J. 44, 44 (2014).
23 Id.
24 See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 462 (2013).
Examples of states that allow judges to use social media are: California, Connecticut,
Florida, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
and Tennessee. See California Judges Ass’n Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. No. 66 (2010),
available at http://www.caljudges.org/files/pdf/Opinion%2066FinalShort.pdf; Connecticut
Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Informal Op. 2013-06 (2013), available at http://www.jud.ct.gov/
committees/ethics/sum/2013-06.htm; Florida Supreme Court Judicial Ethics Advisory
Comm., Op. 2009-20 (2009), available at http://www.jud6.org/LegalCommunity/
LegalPractice/opinions/jeacopinions/2009/2009-20.html; Kentucky Ethics Comm. of the
Kentucky Judiciary, Formal Op. JE-119 (2010), available at http:// courts.ky.gov/
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taken various positions on the extent of this privilege. Tennessee simply
suggests that judges be constantly aware of ethical issues,25 but other
authorities are more specific. Some of these authorities allow judges to
“friend” any lawyer on social media regardless of whether the judge knows
that the lawyer will likely appear before him.26 Although this approach
appears lenient, the privilege of social media does not come without
warning.27 Additionally, some states may require a judge to consider
disclosing a particular friendship or recusing himself from the case.28 For
example, authority from California advises judges to consider all the
circumstances, but it focuses on the four following factors:
 the nature of the particular page, such as whether it
discloses personal information or instead is a page
for an organization like an alumni group;
commissionscommittees/JEC/JEC_Opinions/JE_119.pdf; Massachusetts Comm. on Judicial
Ethics, Op. 2011-6 (2011), available at http://www.mass.gov/courts/case-legal-res/ethicsopinions/judicial-ethics-opinions/cje-opin-2011-6.html; New York Advisory Comm. on
Judicial Ethics, Op. 08-176 (2009), available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/
judicialethics/opinions/08-176.htm; Supreme Court of Ohio Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances &
Discipline, Op.2010-7 (2010), available at http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/Boards/BOC/
Advisory_Opinions/2010/Op_10-007.doc; Oklahoma Judicial Ethics Advisory Panel, Op.
2011-3 (2011), available at http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?
CiteID=464147; South Carolina Advisory Comm. on Standards of Judicial Conduct, Op. 172009
(2009),
available
at
http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/advisoryOpinions/
displayadvopin.cfm?advOpinNo=17-2009; Tennessee Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op.
12-01 (2012), available at http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/docs/advisory_
opinion_12-01.pdf; Lorie Savin, Friend Requests and Beyond: Judicial Ethics in the Social
Networking Sphere, MICH. BUS. J., Aug. 2014, at 18, 18–19, available at
http://www.michbar.org/journal/pdf/pdf4article1959.pdf (discussing judicial ethics relating
to social networking in an article endorsed by the Michigan Committee on Judicial Ethics).
25 Tennessee Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 12-01.
26 See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 462; California
Judges Ass’n Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. No. 66; Kentucky Ethics Comm. of the Kentucky
Judiciary, Formal Op. JE-119; New York Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 08-176;
Supreme Court of Ohio Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline, Op. No. 2010-7; South
Carolina Advisory Comm. on Standards of Judicial Conduct, Op. 17-2009; Savin, supra note
24, at 18–19 (discussing judicial ethics relating to social networking in an article endorsed
by the Michigan Committee on Judicial Ethics).
27 See Kentucky Ethics Comm. of the Kentucky Judiciary, Formal Op. JE-119
(warning that using social networks is “fraught with peril”); Supreme Court Ohio Bd. of
Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline, Op. No. 2010-7 (suggesting that the judge be constantly
vigilant); South Carolina Advisory Comm. on Standards of Judicial Conduct, Op. 17-2009
(warning judges who use Facebook not to discuss their position); Savin, supra note 24, at 18–
19 (warning judges, in an article endorsed and reviewed by the Michigan Committee on
Judicial Ethics, to be cautious in their use of social networking).
28 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 462 (requiring judges to
carefully evaluate whether disclosure or recusal is necessary); California Judges Ass’n
Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 66 (imposing various limitations); New York Advisory Comm. on
Judicial Ethics, Op. 08-176 (explaining how a judge may need to disclose a relationship and
recuse himself if that relationship is a “close social relationship”).
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the number of friends the judge has, with a lower
number suggesting that each friend is somehow
more special;
 the judge’s method of accepting friend requests such
as whether he or she accepts some or all friend
requests or whether there is a pattern such as
exclusively including plaintiffs’ lawyers or all
lawyers from a certain firm; and
 the regularity of a particular attorney’s appearances
before the judge.29
A different approach is evident in other states that allow judges to
friend any lawyer on social media as long as the judge does not know that
the lawyer will appear before him.30 For instance, Massachusetts requires
a judge to recuse himself if he faces a friended lawyer.31 Other restrictions
on social media may also apply in these states.32 For example, even if a
Florida judge includes a disclaimer on a social network page that explains
how friend on social media does not mean friend in the traditional sense,
the disclaimer will not be enough to cure any “impermissible impression
that the judge’s attorney ‘friends’ are in a special position to influence the
judge.”33 However, a Florida judge may belong to a non-legal
organization’s Facebook page even if lawyers who appear before him
participate in that organization.34 Further, Florida allows a judicial
candidate to friend lawyers who, if the person is elected, will appear before
him.35
29

California Judges Ass’n Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 66.
See Connecticut Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Informal Op. 2013-06 (2013), available
at http://www.jud.ct.gov/committees/ethics/sum/2013-06.htm; Florida Supreme Court
Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2012-12 (2012), available at http://www.jud6.org/
LegalCommunity/LegalPractice/opinions/jeacopinions/2012/2012-12.html; Florida Supreme
Court Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2010-06 (2010), available at http://www.jud6.org/
LegalCommunity/LegalPractice/opinions/jeacopinions/2010/2010-06.html; Massachusetts
Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 2011-6 (2011), available at http://www.mass.gov/courts/caselegal-res/ethics-opinions/judicial-ethics-opinions/cje-opin-2011-6.html; Oklahoma Judicial
Ethics Advisory Panel, Op. 2011-3 (2011), available at http://www.oscn.net/applications/
oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=464147.
31 Massachusetts Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 2011-6.
32 See Florida Supreme Court Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2010-06; see also
Connecticut Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Informal Op. 2013-06 (imposing twelve limitations
on using social media); Oklahoma Judicial Ethics Advisory Panel, Op. 2011-3 (warning that
judges’ use of social media is “fraught with peril”).
33 Florida Supreme Court Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2010-06.
34 Id.
35 Florida Supreme Court Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2010-05 (2010),
available at http://www.jud6.org/LegalCommunity/LegalPractice/opinions/jeacopinions/
2010/2010-05.html. For restrictions on campaigns, see Florida Supreme Court Judicial
30
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Despite these various positions, some common warnings and
admonitions are evident among the various rules and opinions. One of
these admonitions appears in New York’s requirement that every
comment, post, and photograph maintain the dignity of the bench.36 Other
examples of these common warnings and admonitions are clearly evident
in the following opinions of the Connecticut Committee on Judicial Ethics
that require judges using social media to:
 Use communication that does not “erode confidence
in the independence of judicial decision-making”;37
 Refrain from posting “any material that could be
construed as advancing the interests of the judge or
others,” such as “liking” a commercial or advocacy
website;38
 Avoid relationships with people or organizations
that may give the impression that these people or
organizations are able to influence the judge;39
 Keep from friending social workers or “any other
persons who regularly appear in court in an
adversarial role”;40
 Ensure their comments do not discuss any pending
or impending court issues;41
 Refrain from viewing parties’ or witnesses’ social
networking pages;42
 Avoid giving legal advice to others;43
 Stay away from political activities on social
networking sites such as public endorsements or
oppositions to a candidate for public office, liking a
political organization’s Facebook page or linking to
political organization websites, and commenting on

Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2010-28 (2010), available at http://www.jud6.org/
LegalCommunity/LegalPractice/opinions/jeacopinions/2010/2010-28.html.
36 New York Advisory Comm’n on Judicial Ethics, Op. 08-176 (2009), available at
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/judicialethics/opinions/08-176.htm.
37 Connecticut Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Informal Op. 2013-06 (2013), available at
http://www.jud.ct.gov/Committees/ethics/sum/2013-06.htm.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
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proposed legislation or controversial political
topics;44 and

Remain “aware of the contents of his/her social
networking profile page, be familiar with the site’s
policies and privacy controls, and stay abreast of new
features and changes.”45
In contrast to the various authorities’ approaches, an author recently
argued that all of these authorities take an unrealistic view of the word
“friend” in the context of social media, and he called for them to take a
more “digitally enlightened” view.46 As the minority members of the
Florida Supreme Court Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee noted, “the
term ‘friend’ on these pages does not convey the same meaning that it did
in the pre-internet age.”47 Which approach will “win” this view of what
exactly “friend” means remains to be seen, but caution is obviously the
operative word.
B. Policies to Consider Beyond Friending
Whether a judge decides to friend lawyers or not, judges need to
ensure that court personnel understand that their posts about a judge’s
schedule, pending matters, or court business generally can reflect poorly
on the court. Additionally, these posts may provide an unfair advantage
to a litigant or counsel. For example, knowing that a judge is taking a
vacation may prove to be valuable information in some instances such as
mediation. If parties are mediating while a summary judgment motion is
pending, one party’s knowledge that the judge will not be ruling on the
motion any time soon could affect settlement positions. Thus, judges
should carefully consider what they do on the Internet and social media.
II. ETHICAL ISSUES ARISING FROM PERSON-TO-PERSON COMMUNICATIONS
A. Confidentiality of E-mail
Most lawyers use e-mail without encrypting the text or attachments.
This seems to comply with the standard of care—at least with respect to
routine communications—even though e-mail can be intercepted and
misdirected.48 Nonetheless, some communications among lawyers and
44

Id.
Id.
46 Browning, supra note 21, at 490, 532–33.
47 Florida Supreme Court Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2009-20 (2009),
available at http://www.jud6.org/LegalCommunity/LegalPractice/opinions/jeacopinions/
2009/2009-20.html.
48 See Kristin J. Hazelwood, Technology and Client Communications: Preparing Law
Students and New Lawyers to Make Choices That Comply with the Ethical Duties of
Confidentiality, Competence, and Communication, 83 MISS. L.J. 245, 259, 261 (2014). For a
45
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clients present a greater risk of harm than others. Thus, they may require
encryption.
The same is no doubt true of communications among court staff.
Security over e-mail can take various forms, but court staff can use it in
its simplest form. They can agree to use “security” features in Microsoft
Word to require a password to open attachments, and the password would
be the same for every document (e.g., a sports’ team’s name, the county in
which the court sits, the judge’s middle name, and so on). While the
attachment won’t be encrypted, only someone with expert skills will be
able to easily open it.
When e-mail is encrypted, only the most determined user could
possibly open it. The technology to encrypt the content of an e-mail and
its attachment is built into most e-mail software. While the particular
details vary, there is often an option to simply encrypt all e-mails or a
particular e-mail and its attachment. A Google search of “encryption”
along with the software’s name, its version number, and the operating
system will likely result in a simple set of instructions for encryption.
Judges should consider whether to permit transmission of all or only
some judicial documents. If a judge decides to permit this transmission,
he should then decide whether encryption or at least password protection
should be required. Having a uniform policy among courthouse personnel
is critical because the protection is largely illusory if all but one person
does not use encryption.
B. The Permanency of Text Messages
Text messages have become evidence in many high- and low-profile
cases, but the most recent case was the “bridge scandal” involving
Governor Christie of New Jersey.49 People text much more informally than
they would write. While texts feel ephemeral, the content of a text
message can, in fact, persist for a long time. Various high-profile cases
involving alleged abuse or discrimination make that point clear.50
recent argument to the contrary, see Rebecca Bolin, Risky Mail: Concerns in Confidential
Attorney-Client Email, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 601, 652–54 (2012) (stating that common sense tells
attorneys that some information requires special effort to protect in an e-mail).
49 Heather Haddon, Subpoena Hunts for Bridge Scandal Text Messages Between
Christie, Aide, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 27, 2014, 12:20 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/metropolis/
2014/08/27/bridge-scandal-text-messages-between-christie-aide-subpoenaed/.
50 See, e.g., Lizette Alvarez, Defense in Trayvon Martin Case Raises Questions About
the Victim’s Character, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2013, at A15 (examining old text messages that
raised character questions about Trayvon Martin); Gregory S. McNeal, Adrian Peterson’s
Indefensible Abuse of a 4-Year-Old Likely Violates Texas Law, FORBES (Sept. 16, 2014, 5:11
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/gregorymcneal/2014/09/16/adrian-petersons-indefensibleabuse-of-a-4-year-old-likely-violates-texas-law/ (discussing various incriminatory picture
text messages that allegedly show Adrian Peterson’s abuse of his son).
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Unfortunately, court personnel may not be aware of these facts. As a
result, embarrassing texts, inappropriate texts, and other awkward
communications may become public. Warning court personnel to use texts
with the view toward disclosure or inadvertent disclosure may be the best
policy.
C. The Hidden Dangers of Metadata
In order to grasp the dangers of metadata, it is important to
understand what metadata is. “Metadata is ‘data about data.’ ”51 Software
often creates metadata and stores it unseen—unless the user knows
where to look—in a single file; when that file is transmitted as an e-mail
attachment, the metadata often goes with it.52 However, this often does
not matter. Some metadata included in a Word document, for example,
consists of information like how many words are in the document or when
the document was prepared.53 In many instances, that information will
have very little significance to anyone.
But some metadata may not be so benign. The worst culprit is the
“track changes” feature that, when enabled, records who, when, and what
changes were made to a document; it also tracks multiple “undo’s,” which
allows the recipient to repeatedly “undo” changes to a document and see
the edits made over time.54 Imagine a draft settlement agreement that
originally proposed offering $100,000 to settle the case, but was revised to
reflect a $50,000 initial offer. The recipient may be able to “undo” the
changes or “track” them to see that the original offer was intended to be
much higher. This can obviously have real-world impact.
The Model Rules require lawyers to use reasonable care in the
storage and transmission of confidential information.55 Thus, a lawyer
who knows a document contains embedded information generally has a
duty to remove it before transmission where that information could be
misused. Although this seems relatively clear, the Model Rules go further
than simply requiring the obvious. The comment emphasizes, for example,
that lawyers “act competently” to guard against disclosure of
confidences.56 While a few years ago, it may have been that the existence
of track changes and other potentially malevolent metadata was not
widely known, and could not have been found without reasonable care, the
same is probably not true today, at least in relatively sophisticated
51 David Hricik & Chase Edward Scott, Metadata: The Ghosts Haunting eDocuments, 13 GA. B.J. 16, 16 (2008).
52 Id.
53 Id. at 17–18.
54 Id. at 16–18.
55 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(C), cmts. 18 & 19 (2014).
56 See id. R. 1.6 cmt. 18.
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practice areas. Reasonable care in today’s highly technological practice
probably does not depend on what special programs an attorney may use
to access confidential information.57 Rather, reasonable care likely means
knowing whether the recipient can use the same software in which the
document was prepared to view client confidences that were
unintentionally included with the file.58
Is it ethical for a lawyer who receives a file to check to see if the
sender erred and included metadata that might be useful? There is no
specific rule that says that a lawyer cannot take advantage of the
incompetence of opposing counsel, and zealous representation obviously
requires that lawyers regularly do so. Bar associations, however, are still
determining whether looking in the opposing client’s confidences in
transmitted files is “conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation.”59 State bar associations that have dealt with
metadata are split on how to do so.60
Some states—like Alabama, Arizona, Florida, and New York—take
the position that it is unethical to purposefully search for metadata.61 One
opinion emphasized that it was not the carelessness of the transmitting
lawyer that lead to the misuse, but instead, “it is a deliberate act by the
receiving lawyer . . . that would lead to the disclosure of client confidences
and secrets” in the metadata.62
But other bar associations disagree. The ABA, Colorado Bar
Association, and Oregon State Bar find nothing unethical with
57 See Oregon State Bar, Formal Op. 2011-187 (2011), available at https://
www.osbar.org/_docs/ethics/2011-187.pdf (recognizing that it might be unethical for a lawyer
to use specialized software to search for hidden information).
58 See id. (“With respect to metadata in documents, reasonable care includes taking
steps to prevent the inadvertent disclosure of metadata, to limit the nature and scope of the
metadata revealed, and to control to whom the document is sent. What constitutes
reasonable care will change as technology evolves.”); Minnesota Court Rules, Op. 22 cmt.
(2010), available at https://www.revisor.mn.gov/court_rules/rule.php?type=pr&subtype=
lawy&id=22 (stating “a lawyer must take reasonable steps to prevent the disclosure of
confidential metadata”).
59 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2007).
60 Compare infra notes 61–62 and accompanying text (reasoning that purposefully
searching for metadata is unethical), with infra notes 63–64 and accompanying text
(reasoning that searching for metadata is ethical).
61 See Alabama State Bar Office of Gen. Counsel, Formal Op. RO-2007-02 (2007),
available at https://www.alabar.org/resources/office-of-general-counsel/formal-opinions/
2007-02/; State Bar of Arizona Ethics, Op. 07-03 (2007), available at http://www.azbar.org/
Ethics/EthicsOpinions/ViewEthicsOpinion?id=695; Professional Ethics of the Florida Bar,
Op. 06-2 (2006), available at https://www.floridabar.org/tfb/tfbetopin.nsf/SearchView/
ETHICS,+OPINION+06-2?opendocument; New York State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l
Ethics, Op. 749 (2001), available at https://www.nysba.org/CustomTemplates/
Content.aspx?id=5463.
62 New York State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 749.
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deliberately digging for metadata gold.63 The District of Columbia Bar
drew the line in a different place; viewing metadata is only dishonest if,
before viewing it, the recipient actually knew that opposing counsel had
inadvertently sent the document with the hidden information.64
Only eighteen states currently have an opinion on metadata.65 Yet, it
is only a matter of time until the other thirty-two states adopt formal
ethics opinions that will govern what lawyers must do.
For the judiciary, this means that courts must be particularly careful
to avoid transmitting information to litigants or transmitting public
documents without ensuring that any metadata has been removed.66
Lawyers may be mining away. In this regard, at least in federal court and
under the Pacer system, files are in PDF format that generally does not
contain metadata of any import.67
D. Third-Party Storage of Court Data: Storms in the Cloud?
Court personnel may be using vendors such as Dropbox, Google, and
others to store documents so that they can be easily accessed at the
courthouse, at home, or through a mobile device. Putting documents “on
the cloud” has become common.68 While extraordinarily convenient,
storing data on third-party sites also creates risks.69 The vendor’s

63

See ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-442
(2006); Colorado Ethics Handbook, Op. 119 (2011), available at http://www.cobar.org/
repository/Ethics/FormalEthicsOpion/FormalEthicsOpinion_119_2011.pdf; Oregon State
Bar, Formal Op. 2011-187 (2011), available at https://www.osbar.org/_docs/ethics/2011187.pdf.
64 D.C. Bar, Ethics Op. 341 (2007), available at http://www.dcbar.org/barresources/legal-ethics/opinions/opinion341.cfm.
65 See American Bar Association, Metadata Ethics Opinions Around the U.S.,
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/departments_offices/
legal_technology_resources/resources/charts_fyis/metadatachart.html (last visited Nov. 14,
2014) (noting that only eighteen states have ethics opinions regarding metadata).
66 For further information regarding the treatment of metadata, including a step-bystep tutorial on how to remove it from documents, see Hricik & Scott, supra note 51, at 16–
20, 22, 24.
67 See Garry R. Appel, The Practical Paperless Office, COLO. LAW., Jan. 2008, at 55,
57 (“Federal courts nationwide have moved to electronic filing of pleadings, and PDF is the
only format the courts will accept.”); Blake A. Klinkner, Metadata: What Is It? How Can It
Get Me into Trouble? What Can I Do About It?, WYO. LAW., Apr. 2014, at 18, 20 (explaining
how PDF copies of files contain less metadata than original files of documents).
68 See Quentin Hardy, The Era of Cloud Computing, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2014, at
F1 (“You already work in the cloud, too, if you use a smartphone, tablet or web browser. And
you’re using the cloud if you’re tapping online services like Dropbox or Apple’s iCloud or
watching ‘House of Cards’ on Netflix.”).
69 See Brian X. Chen, Apple Says It Will Add New iCloud Security Measures After
Celebrity Hack, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 5, 2014, at B2.
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obligations of confidentiality may not be as vigorous as the judiciary’s,70
and the documents may become public if security is breached. Thus, courts
should ensure that court personnel use only third-party vendors with
excellent protective measures if such use is permitted at all.
III. DATA HELD OR ACCESSIBLE BY DEPARTING COURT PERSONNEL
If court personnel are permitted to store important information on
the cloud or on personal devices, the court should ensure that former
employees can no longer access that information when they depart. At the
same time, the court should also make sure that it maintains access to the
information. This may require having employees disclose their username
and password for any sites and promptly changing this information when
a former employee departs.
IV. LAWYERS’ USE OF THE INTERNET TO RESEARCH JURORS
Judges have encouraged lawyers to research potential jurors for
conflicts; for example, the Supreme Court of Missouri noted that because
“advances in technology allow[ ] greater access to information,” it could
place a “greater burden” on parties to raise improper jury issues to the
court.71 In another recent case, a New Jersey Superior Court held that a
trial judge “acted unreasonably” by preventing plaintiff’s counsel from
using his laptop to research jurors during voir dire.72
Consistent with these findings, a few bar associations have issued
opinions that essentially give lawyers the green light to use social media
content to research jurors and potential jurors with a few limitations.73
A recent opinion from the New York City Bar is the most
comprehensive of these opinions.74 The opinion first concluded that a
lawyer could not communicate with a juror or potential juror, and it
reasoned that an improper communication occurred if, as a result of the
research, the juror would receive a communication such as a friend

70 Compare
Dropbox Privacy Policy, DROPBOX (Mar. 24, 2014), https://
www.dropbox.com/terms#privacy, with MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(C), cmts. 18
& 19 (2014).
71 Johnson v. McCullough, 306 S.W.3d 551, 558–59 (Mo. 2010).
72 Carino v. Muenzen, No. A-5491-08T1, 2010 WL 3448071, at *24, *26–27 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 30, 2010).
73 E.g., ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-466
(2014),
available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
professional_responsibility/formal_opinion_466_final_04_23_14.authcheckdam.pdf; Ass’n.
of the Bar of the City of New York Comm. on Prof’l. Ethics Formal Op. No. 2010-2, available
at http://www.nycbar.org/ethics/ethics-opinions-local/2010-opinions/786-obtaining-evidencefrom-social-networking-websites.
74 See infra notes 75–80 and accompanying text.
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request on Facebook.75 The opinion emphasized that any indication to the
juror that the lawyer had accessed their information would be improper.76
Second, it emphasized that a lawyer cannot use deception to obtain
access.77 Finally, the opinion concluded that the same restrictions applied
to agents (such as undercover investigators) hired by the lawyer to
conduct this research.78 Significantly, the opinion emphasized that
lawyers probably had a duty, within the scope of the opinion, to research
the jurors.79
Despite the ostensible duty to research the background of jurors and
the convenience of using social media sites to do so, “even jurors who
understand that many of their social networking posts and pages are
public may be discouraged from jury service by the knowledge that
attorneys and judges can and will conduct active research on them or learn
of their online—albeit public—social lives.”80 Further, lawyers should be
admonished to report juror misconduct they discover. In one interesting
case, a court granted a new trial, based on juror misconduct, as to three of
four defendants, but not to the fourth because his lawyers had reason to
know of the misconduct through their Internet searches but had done
nothing.81 Clearly, lawyers’ use of social media to research jurors and
potential jurors may be beneficial to litigants, but it may also be awkward
for the judge and jury.

75 Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York Comm. on Prof’l. Ethics, Formal Op. 20122 (2012), available at http://www.nycbar.org/ethics/ethics-opinions-local/2012opinions/1479formal-opinion-2012-02.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id. See also Ass’n. of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof. and Judicial Ethics
Formal Op. No. 2010-2, available at http://www.nycbar.org/ethics/ethics-opinions-local/2010opinions/786-obtaining-evidence-from-social-networking-websites; N.Y. St. Bar Ass’n
Formal Op. 843, available at http://www.nysba.org/CustomTemplates/Content.aspx?
id=5162; N.Y. County Lawyers’ Ass’n. Formal Op. 743, available at https://www.nycla.org/
siteFiles/Publications/Publications1450_0.pdf (stating only proper to use Twitter, Facebook,
and other sites to research potential and actual jurors); San Diego Cnty. Bar Legal Ethics
Op. 2011-2, available at https://www.sdcba.org/index.cfm?pg=LEC2011-2 (stating a lawyer
cannot friend represented party); Sharon R. Klein, et al., Ethical Issues that Arise From
Social Media Use in Courtrooms, N.J. LAWYER, http://www.pepperlaw.com/pdfs/
Klein_Stio_Zurich_NJL_10_2013.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2014).
80 Ass’n. of the Bar of the City of New York Comm. on Prof’l Ethics Formal Op. 20122.
81 United States v. Daugerdas, 867 F. Supp. 2d 445, 458, 460–61, 466, 484–85
(S.D.N.Y. 2012).
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V. JURORS’ USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE INTERNET
Another issue that judges should be aware of is jurors’ use of the
Internet to research and discuss their cases. Interestingly, there is a blog
devoted to misbehaving jurors!82 Every week, its author (a judge) seems to
have another example of intentional or inadvertent misconduct.83 Some
recent examples include a mistrial where a juror researched potential
sentences in rape a case84 and a discharge of an entire jury pool due to one
juror searching for the defendant’s name on Google.85
A. Jurors’ Use of the Internet to Research Facts and Law
Jurors are human, and juries have long had access to newspapers,
television, and their neighbors. Additionally, jurors are, no doubt,
sometimes frustrated by the lack of “relevant” evidence at trial. This often
leads jurors to conduct their own Internet research as was the case in
State v. Abdi where the Supreme Court of Vermont overturned a child
sexual assault conviction after learning that a juror performed his own
research on the cultural significance of the alleged crime in Somali Bantu
culture.86 The New York Law Journal also reported a number of cases
where jurors harmed the system by researching facts, law, or general
issues.87 For example, a Washington Court of Appeals overturned a $4.3
million dollar employment discrimination verdict when the court learned
the jury had researched the employer’s annual earnings.88
The U.S. legal system is not alone, as reports from across the globe
show jurors using the Internet to conduct research.89 Several countries
82 See JURORS BEHAVING BADLY, http://jurorsbehavingbadly.blogspot.com (last
visited Nov. 14, 2014).
83 Id.
84 Stephen M. Halsey, Juror Researching Penalty Causes Mistrial of Rape Case,
JURORS BEHAVING BADLY (Jan. 23, 2014, 7:14 PM), http://jurorsbehavingbadly.blogspot.com/
2014/01/juror-researching-penalty-causes.html (citing Ken Armstrong, Case of the Curious
Juror: When the Web Invades the Courtroom, SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 18, 2014, 8:25 PM),
http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2022703634_jurorsinternetxml.html).
85 Stephen M. Halsey, Entire Jury Pool Discharged After Juror Google-searches
Defendant, JURORS BEHAVING BADLY (Jan. 31, 2014, 11:45 AM), http://
jurorsbehavingbadly.blogspot.com/2014/01/entire-jury-pool-discharged-after-juror.html.
86 State v. Abdi, 2012 VT 4, ¶ 1, 191 Vt. 162, 45 A.3d 29.
87 Daniel A. Ross, Juror Abuse of the Internet, N.Y.L.J. (Sept. 8, 2009), available at
http://www.stroock.com/SiteFiles/Pub828.pdf.
88 Sheffield v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 151 Wash. App. 1052 (2009) (unpublished
opinion).
89 See, e.g., PAUL LAMBERT, COURTING PUBLICITY: TWITTER AND TELEVISION
CAMERAS IN COURT 27–28 (2011); Anna Vidot, Internet Research by Jurors Could Lead More
Defendants to Choose Judge-Only Trials, ABC NEWS (July 31, 2014 12:38 PM),
http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2014/s4057822.htm.
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have adopted various electronic countermeasures.90 Clearly, jurors’ use of
the Internet to research issues in their case is a significant problem about
which judges must be aware.
B. Jurors’ Use of the Internet to Discuss Pending Cases
Although jurors are told not to discuss a case until it is submitted to
them,91 improper pre-submission communication occurs.92 The Internet
makes this improper communication easier.93 As one court recently noted,
“the widespread availability of the Internet and the extensive use of social
networking sites, such as Twitter and Facebook, [has] exponentially
increased the risk of prejudicial communication amongst jurors and
opportunities to exercise persuasion and influence upon jurors.”94
The Third Circuit recently addressed this issue in United States v.
Fumo: “Not unlike a juror who speaks with friends or family members
about a trial before the verdict is returned, a juror who comments about a
case on the internet or social media may engender responses that include
extraneous information about the case, or attempts to exercise persuasion
and influence.”95 In this case, on the eve of the second day of deliberations,
a juror posted on Facebook that he was “ ‘not sure about tomorrow.’ ”96 A
friend of the juror then posted, “why?” to which the juror responded, “think
of the last five months dear.”97
A recent article cataloged the rising number of controversies arising
from jury misconduct.98 Among other things, the authors note that a guilty
verdict in a murder case in Arkansas was overturned because a juror had
tweeted during the trial.99 Other examples of jurors using social media
include Al Roker’s tweet about reporting for grand jury duty and posting
90 See LAMBERT supra note 89, at 27–28; see also Thaddeus Hoffmeister, Google,
Gadgets, and Guilt: Juror Misconduct in the Digital Age, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 409, 413 (2012);
Jason Deans, Facebook Juror Jailed for Eight Months, THE GUARDIAN (June 16, 2011, 6:07
PM), http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/jun/16/facebook-juror-jailed-for-eight-months.
91 See, e.g., United States v. Gianakos, 404 F.3d 1065, 1073–74 (8th Cir. 2005).
92 See United States v. Juror No. One, 866 F. Supp. 2d 442, 444–45, 448–49, 451, 453
(E.D. Pa. 2011) (holding that a dismissed juror improperly communicated with other jurors
about her opinion on the trial before the case was submitted for deliberation).
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 305 (3d Cir. 2011).
96 Id. at 298.
97 Id. at 298 n.3.
98 Amy J. St. Eve & Michael A. Zuckerman, Ensuring an Impartial Jury in the Age
of Social Media, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 3, 7, 9 (2012), available at
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1228&context=dltr.
99 Id. at 2–3 (citing Dimas-Martinez v. State, 2011 Ark. 515, at 11–18, 385 S.W.3d
238, 246–49 (Ark. Dec. 8, 2011)).
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photographs, and a potential juror tweeting “ ‘Guilty! He’s guilty! I can
tell’ ” during jury selection.100 Sometimes, however, courts find blogging
and other communication proper as long as the juror does not discuss the
case or his opinion on the case.101
C. Courts Fight Back: Model Instructions and Beyond
Courts have responded in various ways to jurors’ Internet research
and discussion of their cases. While holding a juror in contempt or
declaring a mistrial protects the rights of the litigants, it does not result
in efficient litigation. Thus, judges are expanding their use of jury
instructions that warn against use of social media, or the Internet, to
discuss a case or conduct research.102 In addition, if the judge has jurors
disclose their twitter “handles,” the judge can monitor the jurors’ tweets
during trial.103
A collection of “model” jury instructions concerning the use of the
Internet by jurors to conduct research follows in Appendix A.
VI. JUDICIAL USE OF THE INTERNET TO CONDUCT FACTUAL RESEARCH
The Internet puts the world at our fingertips; Google Maps and other
sites provide pictures of almost every corner of the earth, distances
between points can be plotted on Mapquest, and a certain day’s weather
can be determined with precision on numerous sites. There is a wealth of
information available. Even as to the particular litigants, the Internet
might provide access to their personal webpage, their social media page,
or various “facts” about them posted hither and yon on the Internet.
In our adversary system, however, judicial research into facts creates
some delicate issues. On one hand, consideration of historic facts pertinent
to the dispute without adversary presentation can create ethical and due
100 See Brian Grow, As Jurors Go Online, U.S. Trials Go Off Track, REUTERS (Dec. 8,
2010,
3:23
PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/12/08/us-internet-jurorsidUSTRE6B74Z820101208; Corky Siemaszko, Al Roker Gets Ripped for Snapping Court Pix
& Tweeting During Jury Duty, NY DAILY NEWS (May 28, 2009, 9:00 PM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/entertainment/tv-movies/al-roker-ripped-snapping-court-pixtweeting-jury-duty-article-1.374749.
101 See State v. Goehring, No. OT-06-023, 2007-Ohio-58862007 Ohio App. LEXIS 5169,
at ¶ 35 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 2, 2007).
102 See Amy J. St. Eve, Charles P. Burns, & Michael A. Zuckerman, More from the
#Jury Box: The Latest on Juries and Social Media, 12 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 64, 86–87
(2014), available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1247&
context=dltr.
103 See generally Hayes Hunt & Brian Kint, Trial and Social Media: Researching
Potential Jurors, (Feb. 3, 2014), http://www.fromthesidebar.com/2014/02/03/trial-and-socialmedia-researching-potential-jurors-3/ (explaining how defense attorneys should continue
conducting Internet and social media research into jurors and immediately disclosing any
misconduct to the tribunal).
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process concerns. On the other, while a judge “must not independently
investigate facts in a case and must consider only the evidence
presented,”104 a judge may take judicial notice as allowed by law.105 As
recently amended in Georgia, judicial notice is governed by statute, which
provides:
(a) This Code section governs only judicial notice of adjudicative
facts.
(b) A judicially noticed fact shall be a fact which is not subject to
reasonable dispute in that it is either:
(1) Generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court; or
(2) Capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.
(c) A court may take judicial notice, whether or not requested by a
party.
(d) A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a party and
provided with the necessary information.
(e) A party shall be entitled, upon timely request, to an opportunity
to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of
the matter noticed. In the absence of prior notification, such request
may be made after judicial notice has been taken.
(f) Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the proceeding.
(g)
(1) In a civil proceeding, the court shall instruct the jury to
accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed.
(2) In a criminal proceeding, the court shall instruct the jury that
it may, but is not required to, accept as conclusive any fact judicially
noticed.106

At the outset of this analysis, the fact that a judge uses the Internet,
rather than some other means of research, does not seem pertinent to
whether and to what extent research is permissible. While the Internet
certainly makes it easier to find facts, it does not alter the question
presented. Thus, a judge should not investigate facts independently,
whether on the Internet or not, except to the extent that the fact can be
judicially noticed.107
In analyzing the breadth of the “exception” to the prohibition against
independent factual research, one commentator observed:
By including the reference to judicial notice, however, the Model
Code opens a loophole. If the ethics rules are meant to incorporate the
totality of federal and state evidence rules’ approach to what judges can
“know” on their own, the research prohibition is a narrow one. Judges
may not independently investigate adjudicative facts—the facts that
104
105
106
107

GEORGIA CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS CANON 3 (Commentary 2011).
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 201.
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2-201 (Lexis through 2014 Reg. Sess.).
ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2.9(C) (2007).
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are at issue in the particular case—unless they are generally known or
“capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” But they may
independently ascertain and use information that meets the
requirements for judicial notice, and they may investigate “legislative
facts”—those that inform the court’s judgment when deciding questions
of law or policy—to their hearts’ content, bound by no rules about
sources, reliability, or notice to the parties.108

Courts have used the Internet to take judicial notice of facts, but they have
not always done so without dissent.109 This is rare: for example, the only
Georgia case that seems to have used the Internet to take judicial notice
involved arbitration rules posted on organization webpages.110 Courts are
split on whether and to what extent judicial notice may be taken about
information that originated from the Internet.111 Even if judicial notice is
appropriate, some courts have held that judicial factual investigation on
the Internet implicates Due Process concerns112 and issues concerning the
competency of the judge to be a witness.113
VII. MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES
A. Blogging
Washington has permitted judicial officers to blog, but it has warned
that they should be careful that their blogs are not used to question their
impartiality.114 Additionally, Washington has suggested that the judicial
officers include a disclaimer stating that the opinions are theirs and not

108 Elizabeth G. Thornburg, The Curious Appellate Judge: Ethical Limits on
Independent Research, 28 REV. LITIG. 131, 136 (2008) (footnote omitted).
109 See, e.g., Gent v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc’y, 611 F.3d 79, 84 n.5 (1st Cir. 2010) (taking
judicial notice of information that came from the Center for Disease Control and Prevention’s
website); Oken v. Williams, 23 So.3d 140, 148 n.2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (defending the
majority’s use of Internet websites to define “specialist” in a medical malpractice action and
contending it fell within the judicial notice exception), quashed on other grounds, 62 So. 3d
1129 (Fla. 2011).
110 Miller v. GGNSC Atlanta, LLC, 746 S.E.2d 680, 686 n.11 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013).
111 Compare Gent, 611 F.3d at 84 n.5 (taking judicial notice of information that came
from a website), and Oken, 23 So.3d at 148 n.2 (defending use of Internet websites as
acceptable under the judicial notice exception), with United States ex rel. Dingle v. Bioport
Corp., 270 F.Supp.2d 968, 972–73 (W.D. Mich. 2003) (taking judicial notice of only some
pertinent information that originated on the Internet), and NYC Med. & Neurodiagnostic,
P.C. v. Republic W. Ins. Co., 798 N.Y.S.2d 309, 313 (N.Y. Supp. App. 2004) (holding that
independent factual research on the part of judges is error).
112 Kiniti-Wairimu v. Holder, 312 F. App’x 907, 908–09 (9th Cir. 2009).
113 E.g., NYC Med. & Neurodiagnostic, P.C., 798 N.Y.S.2d at 312–13 (determining
that the court was wrong to conduct its own research to reach its conclusion on the case).
114 State of Washington Ethics Advisory Comm. Op. 09-05 (2009), available at
http://www.courts.wa.gov/programs_orgs/pos_ethics/?fa=pos_ethics.dispopin&mode=0905.
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other judges’.115 Obviously, judges should be concerned about lines being
drawn too finely.
B. Do Not Do What These Judges Did
Judges are human. As such, they sometimes do things that might be
considered unwise. For example, the Chief Judge of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit sent a message to a lawyer
commending the lawyer’s skills and inviting him to forward the e-mail to
his clients—the judge later apologized to the court for this act,116 and the
lawyer was publicly reprimanded.117 In another situation, a judge friended
a lawyer who was appearing in a matter before him, created posts with
that lawyer about the pending custody case, reviewed a web page of the
wife, and even quoted a poem that the wife had posted on that page.118 Yet
another example arises from Judge Kozinski and the “private” images he
believed to be privately stored online (including undressed men appearing
with sexually aroused animals) that were actually available publicly
because he did not understand the technology.119 Although these are just
a few examples, they illustrate situations judges should avoid.
CONCLUSION AND SOME PRACTICAL TIPS ON WHAT TO DO
This Article began with the premise that judges likely could not be
Luddites in this technology saturated world. Even if they could only use
an abacus and typewriter, the attorneys, clerks, staff, and jurors around
them would not remain mired in the past. What judges must do is
understand technology even if they do not embrace it. Part of that is
refraining from using software or devices without knowing the risks they
present.
The technology of today can be a significant benefit for judges, but it
can also be a significant problem. Yet, there are some practical things that
judges can do to ensure that they act in an ethical manner while they are
surrounded by technology. One practical tip for judges is understanding
Facebook privacy settings. Judges can learn about these settings on a
specific Facebook page that helps individuals understand the various
potential settings for privacy on Facebook and learn how to adjust
115

Id.
Letter from Randall R. Rader, Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, to the Judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
(May
23,
2014),
available
at
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/5-2314_RRR%20_Letter.pdf.
117 In re Reines, No. 14-MA004 14-4, 2014 WL 5649959, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 5, 2014).
118 In re Terry, Inquiry No. 08-234 (N.C. Judicial Standards Comm’n Apr. 1, 2009),
available at http://www.aoc.state.nc.us/www/public/coa/jsc/publicreprimands/jsc08-234.pdf.
119 Slater, supra note 5.
116
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Facebook privacy settings.120 Judges should also know how to address
metadata in Microsoft Word and other documents. How to deal with
metadata varies by which version of Word is being used, but helpful
resources are available online.121 Password protection for e-mail
attachments is another aspect of technology that judges should consider.
How this can be done depends on the version of Microsoft Word, once
again, the Internet is a good place to find instructions on this topic.122
Judges should also be able to encrypt e-mail attachments. This procedure
varies depending on which version of e-mail software the judge is using,
but online resources are available to explain.123
Lastly, when dealing with the potential issues arising from jurors
utilizing the Internet, judges should consider the proposed model jury
instructions in Appendix A. Mastering these basic techniques and using
these various approaches to technology will enable judges to better avoid
the many pitfalls that exist in today’s technological world.

120 Basic
Privacy Settings & Tools, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/
help/325807937506242/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2014).
121 See Find and Remove Metadata in Your Legal Documents, MICROSOFT OFFICE,
http://office.microsoft.com/en-ca/word-help/find-and-remove-metadata-hidden-informationin-your-legal-documents-HA001077646.aspx (last visited Nov. 14, 2014) (explaining how to
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(last visited Nov. 14, 2014) (explaining how to protect various types of Microsoft Office files
from multiple editions of Microsoft Office).
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APPENDIX A

PROPOSED MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS
THE USE OF ELECTRONIC TECHNOLOGY TO
CONDUCT RESEARCH ON OR COMMUNICATE ABOUT
A CASE†
Prepared by the Judicial Conference Committee on Court Administration
and Case Management
June 2012
[Note: These instructions should be provided to jurors before trial, at
the close of a case, at the end of each day before jurors return home, and
other times, as appropriate.]
BEFORE TRIAL:
You, as jurors, must decide this case based solely on the evidence
presented here within the four walls of this courtroom. This means that
during the trial you must not conduct any independent research about this
case, the matters in the case, and the individuals or corporations involved
in the case. In other words, you should not consult dictionaries or
reference materials, search the internet, websites, blogs, or use any other
electronic tools to obtain information about this case or to help you decide
the case. Please do not try to find out information from any source outside
the confines of this courtroom.
Until you retire to deliberate, you may not discuss this case with
anyone, even your fellow jurors. After you retire to deliberate, you may
begin discussing the case with your fellow jurors, but you cannot discuss
the case with anyone else until you have returned a verdict and the case
is at an end.
I know that many of you use cell phones, Blackberries, the internet
and other tools of technology. You also must not talk to anyone at any time
about this case or use these tools to communicate electronically with
anyone about the case. This includes your family and friends. You may
not communicate with anyone about the case on your cell phone, through
e-mail, Blackberry, iPhone, text messaging, or on Twitter, through any
blog or website, including Facebook, Google+, My Space, LinkedIn, or
YouTube. You may not use any similar technology of social media, even if

†
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON COURT ADMINISTRATION AND CASE
MANAGEMENT, PROPOSED MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: THE USE OF ELECTRONIC
TECHNOLOGY TO CONDUCT RESEARCH ON OR COMMUNICATE ABOUT A CASE (2012), available
at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/News/2012/jury-instructions.pdf.
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I have not specifically mentioned it here. I expect you will inform me as
soon as you become aware of another juror’s violation of these instructions.
I hope that for all of you this case is interesting and noteworthy.
AT THE CLOSE OF THE CASE:
During your deliberations, you must not communicate with or
provide any information to anyone by any means about this case. You may
not use any electronic device or media, such as the telephone, a cell phone,
smart phone, iPhone, Blackberry or computer, the Internet, any Internet
service, any text or instant messaging service, any Internet chat room,
blog, or website such as Facebook, MySpace, LinkedIn, YouTube or
Twitter, to communicate to anyone any information about this case or to
conduct any research about this case until I accept your verdict. In other
words, you cannot talk to anyone on the phone, correspond with anyone,
or electronically communicate with anyone about this case. You can only
discuss the case in the jury room with your fellow jurors during
deliberations. I expect you will inform me as soon as you become aware of
another juror’s violation of these instructions.
You may not use these electronic means to investigate or
communicate about the case because it is important that you decide this
case based solely on the evidence presented in this courtroom. Information
on the internet or available through social media might be wrong,
incomplete, or inaccurate. You are only permitted to discuss the case with
your fellow jurors during deliberations because they have seen and heard
the same evidence you have. In our judicial system, it is important that
you are not influenced by anything or anyone outside of this courtroom.
Otherwise, your decision may be based on information known only by you
and not your fellow jurors or the parties in the case. This would unfairly
and adversely impact the judicial process.

